
Original Article

The impact of election outcomes on satisfaction with democracy under a two-round system

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Abstract Previous research has found a positive relationship between having voted for a party that is part of the government and satisfaction with democracy. However, no research has examined this relationship in the specific case of a two-round system. Relying on original panel data survey conducted before and after the 2012 legislative election in France, this article addresses the question of how vote choices in the first and second rounds affect satisfaction with democracy. We find that both rounds have a similar impact and that voters who rallied a winning party in the second round are as happy with the democratic process as early supporters.

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Introduction

As political scientists started to study electoral systems, they have always been intrigued by the two-round system (TRS). In his seminal work about the effects of electoral systems on the number of parties, Duverger (1954) devoted a particular attention to this electoral system.¹ Next to the restrictive first past the post (FPTP) and the permissive proportional representation (PR) systems, which are said to, respectively, lead to two-party and multi-party systems, the TRS is supposed to be associated with multipartism tempered by electoral alliances. The rationale is that while the first round allows voters to express their sincere preferences among all the



candidates, the second round asks them to tell which one they find most acceptable among the top two or three.

Some contentious issues remain, however, concerning the information available to both voters and candidates at the time of making their decision and the incentives that exist for candidates to coalesce both before and after the first round (Cox, 1997; Callander, 2005; Blais and Indridason, 2007). These features typically undermine the possibility of reaching the ideal situation described by Duverger. As a consequence, the evidence on the precise consequences of TRS for candidates' entry, strategic voting or parliamentary polarization is mixed (Taagepera and Shugart, 1989; Shugart and Carey, 1992; Jones, 1999; Blais and Loewen, 2009; Blais *et al.*, 2011).

In this article, we examine the consequences of TRS for satisfaction with democracy. We investigate how the election outcome affects satisfaction in this specific setting. In the literature, it is shown that voting for the winning party increases citizens' satisfaction with democracy under both FPTP and PR systems (Anderson *et al.*, 2005; Singh, 2013). To our knowledge, no research has examined this relationship in a TRS context, though. The very existence of two rounds and thus of two possibilities of voting for a party that will be part of the government may complicate the picture. One obvious question is whether the first and the second votes have a similar impact on satisfaction with democracy.

In the next section, we review the literature about the effect of winning on satisfaction with democracy and propose some hypotheses about this effect in a TRS context. We then test these hypotheses using an original panel survey conducted before and after the 2012 French national elections. The results suggest that the effect of winning on satisfaction with democracy is no different under TRS than under other electoral systems. In particular, we find that satisfaction is affected by vote choice in both rounds and that voters who rally the winning parties in the second round are as satisfied as early supporters.

Winning, Satisfaction with Democracy and the TRS

We are interested in this study in how the outcome of an election affect people's satisfaction with the way democracy works. We should point out that 'satisfaction with democracy' taps one dimension of regime support. It is a measure of 'regime performance' (Dalton, 2004; Blais and Gélinau, 2007) and as such should be distinguished from support for the principle of democracy. It reflects an evaluation of how the democratic system works in practice. Because it is an evaluation of actual performance it should change over time, as citizens update their judgments on the basis of events, though it should probably be more stable than evaluations of the specific authorities. And indeed Anderson *et al.* (2005, p. 54) show that satisfaction with the political system's performance does shift substantially after an election.

The literature contains abundant evidence that having voted for a party that is part of the government increases satisfaction with democracy. At the origin of this theory lays the idea that all other things being equal, citizens who voted for a governing party are likely to be close to the government in terms of policy position. Their satisfaction with regard to public policies, or the expectation that they will like most of the decisions that the government will make in the near future, makes them happy with the democratic process (Anderson *et al*, 2005; Brunell and Buchler, 2009). Although some data confirm that this policy proximity does partly explain satisfaction (Ezrow and Xezonakis, 2011; Kim, 2009), it is also clear that satisfaction is also associated with the very fact of voting for the winner (Singh *et al*, 2011). Winning produces a range of positive emotions that go beyond the satisfaction produced by the distance between the voter's policy preferences and those of the ruling party (-ies) (Singh *et al*, 2011). Along this line, it should be noted that the simple fact of participating in the electoral process increases citizen's satisfaction with the democratic process, regardless of the electoral outcome (Bowler and Donovan, 2002).

The mediating role of institutions in the relationship between voting for the winning party and the degree of satisfaction with democracy has also been studied. These studies reveal that voting for a party that is part of the government has a positive effect on satisfaction with democracy in both FPTP and PR systems (Anderson *et al*, 2005; Singh *et al*, 2012). However, comparative analyses indicate that the effect of winning and losing is stronger under FPTP. FPTP being less protective of minorities, including the supporters of the losing parties, the supporters of the winning party are even more, and the losers even less, satisfied with democracy (Anderson and Guillory, 1997; Wells and Kriekhaus, 2006; Birch, 2008; Singh, 2013).

However, and as mentioned above, no study has examined the effect of voting for the winning party under TRS. The first question we want to address in this article is then whether the aforementioned findings also hold in this context, regardless of the particularity of the two rounds. On the basis of the conclusions found in the literature about FPTP and PR systems, we derive the following first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: Voting for a winning party, in the first or second round, increases citizens' satisfaction with democracy. (A winning party is here understood as a party that is part of the government formed after the election.)

Before going into more details about the specificities of TRS, a second complementary hypothesis can be formulated. As most parliamentary elections are organized in districts, one might wonder whether winning should be defined at the national level, that is, voting for the party(-ies) forming a government, or at the district level, that is, voting for the party who won the seat in the district. The evidence gathered in the literature in this respect is rather mixed. While some authors find a positive effect of voting for a winning party at the district level, others argue



that only winning at the national level has a true impact on satisfaction with democracy (Anderson and LoTempio, 2002; Blais and Gélinau, 2007; Henderson, 2008; Singh *et al.*, 2011). Therefore, the following hypothesis will also be tested in TRS:

Hypothesis 2: Voting for the winning party at the district level, in the first or second round, increases citizens' satisfaction with democracy.

As mentioned above, the very existence of two rounds, and thus of two possibilities of winning (and losing), may complicate the picture under TRS. Studies on the nature of voting under this system reveal that the first round differs greatly from the second round. In the French Presidential election of 2002, for example, the overall proportion of voters who deserted their preferred candidate because they thought she or he was not a viable option (what is called strategic voting) is estimated at 1 per cent (Blais, 2004). Since the first round is used to qualify candidates for the second one, voters seem to vote more sincerely than strategically. In line with Duverger's reasoning, there are strong reasons to think that voters use the first round to signal their preferences to both other voters and candidates (Piketty, 2000). In voting for their first preference, even if she or he does not have any chance to make it to the second round, they want to encourage the major candidates to change their policy position accordingly (Blais, 2004). One might thus say that voters vote in the first round with their heart, while voting with their head in the second round. From this perspective, it is logical to derive that voting for the winning party in the first round should have a greater effect on satisfaction with democracy than voting for the same winning party in the second round. The first vote is indeed supposed to represent the true choice of voters (implying a greater proximity in terms of policy preferences), whereas the second is constrained by electoral institutions. The following hypothesis is tested:

Hypothesis 3: Voting for a winning party in the first round has a larger positive effect on citizens' satisfaction with democracy than voting for a winning party in the second round.

Empirical Strategy

Data

To investigate how the electoral outcome affects satisfaction with democracy under TRS, we rely on an original two-wave Internet panel survey conducted in June 2012 before the first round, and after the second round of the 2012 French legislative election. The 2000 respondents are two quota-based representative samples of the two most populous regions of the country: Ile-de-France (IDF, Paris and its surroundings) and Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur (PACA, Marseille and its surroundings).

Demographic quotas were set for the pre-election surveys, in each region, using age, gender and education statistics from latest census data. For instance in IDF, male and female represent, respectively, 48 and 52 per cent of the population. Accordingly, out of 1000 respondents of the region, 475 are male and 525 female. Additional details about the representativity can be found in the Appendix.

Dependent variable and models

As dependent variable, we use the following question: ‘To what extent are you satisfied with the way democracy works in France?’ The question was asked in the second wave of the panel, during the week following the election. Answers range from 0 ‘Not at all satisfied’ to 10 ‘Very satisfied’.

To predict levels of satisfaction, we use OLS regressions while accounting for the clustering of respondents by region using fixed effects (IDF as reference). Don’t knows and refusals are excluded. The analyses are conducted on respondents for which we have the information for all variables of interest ($N = 898$).

Independent variables

In order to test our hypotheses, we include in the models information about winning and losing the election. First, at the first round, we specify whether the respondent won at the national level, that is, if he/she voted for one of the two parties that won the majority of the 512 seats in Parliament and were represented in the cabinet. The two parties that won the elections are the Socialist (*Parti Socialiste*, PS) and the Greens (*Europe Ecologie – Les Verts*, EELV). If the respondent voted for another party, he/she is considered to have lost the first round.²

We then include information about winning or losing at the district level in the first round. To participate in the second round, a candidate had to secure 12.5 per cent of the votes. Accordingly, a respondent is considered to have won the first round if he/she voted for a candidate that qualified for the second round in the district. If the candidate the respondent voted for did not qualify for the second round, the respondent is considered to have lost the first round at the district level. We then combine all these variables to isolate four categories of respondents: those who won at both levels, those who won at the national level only, those who won at the district level only and those who lost at both levels.

We construct similar measures regarding the second round. At the national level, respondents who voted for PS or EELV in the second round are considered as winners, and those who voted for another party as losers. At the district level, winning means having voted for the candidate who won in the district, and losing voting for a candidate who lost. We then combine these characteristics to create four categories just as we did for the first round. These sets of variables are used in the first



two models to test Hypotheses 1 and 2. To test Hypothesis 3, we combine the winning/losing variables at the national level in the first and second round.

Control variables

As Blais and G lineau (2007) recommend, we include in our models the respondent's level of satisfaction with democracy before the election. This allows us to isolate the effect of having voted for a winning or losing party on the dependent variable. The exact same question was asked in the first wave of the panel survey, which was conducted a couple of weeks before the election.

Curini *et al* (2012) show that the closer voters are to the winning party, in terms of ideology and policy preferences, the larger the increase in satisfaction with democracy is. We therefore include the distance between the respondent's and the government's position on the left–right scale. This variable is the absolute difference between the respondent's self-placement on a 10-point left–right scale and the weighted mean of the perceived position of the PS and EELV on the same scale.³

In the same vein, Singh's (2013) study shows that winning the election has a larger effect for 'optimal voters' (those who have maximum proximity with the party they voted for) than for 'non-optimal voters' (those who based their vote not on ideology or policy but on strategic calculation). As explained above, the majority of voters in the first round vote for their preferred party. However, a non-negligible part of the electorate bases their choice on strategic considerations. Strategic voting can be motivated by two main reasons. The first is the candidate's viability. In that case, voters choose to vote for a candidate with higher chances of qualifying for the second round than their preferred candidate. The second kind of strategic voting is called inverted strategic voting. This category of voters chooses not to vote for their preferred candidate by sending a signal that they like the policy position (on a specific issue) of that other candidate. In the models examining the effect of first round's results on satisfaction with democracy, we thus also include a measure of whether the respondent voted, at the first round, for his/her preferred party (what is understood here as sincere voting) or not.

Finally, to control for unspecified effects, we include some demographic characteristics of the respondents such as age (measured as a continuous variable), gender (reference category is male) and education (measured as a continuous variable, using four categories ranging from no secondary education to university degree).

Results

Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for the variables of interest. Overall, the level of satisfaction is high, with average satisfaction before the election being six, and with

Table 1: Descriptive statistics for variables of interest

	<i>Mean</i>	<i>N</i>
Satisfaction with democracy before election (0 not satisfied at all; 10 very satisfied)	6.04	898
Satisfaction with democracy after election (0 not satisfied at all; 10 very satisfied)	6.06	898
Left–right distance from government (0 very close; 10 very distant)	2.62	898
	<i>Percentage</i>	<i>N</i>
Voting (first round)	79	898
Voting (second round)	77	898
Voting for a national winning party (first round)	28	898
Voting for a national losing party (first round)	51	898
Voting for a national winning party (second round)	35	898
Voting for a national losing party (second round)	43	898
Voting for a qualified district party (first round)	49	898
Voting for a not-qualified district party (first round)	30	898
Voting for the district winning party (second round)	32	898
Voting for a district losing party (second round)	46	898
Sincere voting (first round)	56	89

more than 60 per cent of the sample expressing levels of satisfaction higher than five, both before and after the election. The overall level of satisfaction is the same before and after the election.

Table 1 reveals that the left–right position of French citizens is not too distant from that of the government parties (2.62 on a 10-point scale). As many as 35 per cent of voters (44 per cent of the respondents) reported having voted for a party that was not their first preference. The winning variables more or less correspond to the overall figures of the election’s results. For instance, 28 per cent of respondents reported to have voted for PS or EELV at the first round, and 35 per cent at the second round (including abstainers).⁴

Table 2 shows the mean levels of satisfaction with democracy, before and after the election, for the different categories of winners/losers. Satisfaction with democracy decreases among abstainers (by 0.36 on the 10-point scale). We can also see that winners have higher levels of satisfaction than losers. The level of satisfaction with democracy increases for voters who voted for a national winning party at the first or the second round of the election while it slightly decreases among national losers. In contrast, there is no clear pattern when winning and losing are defined at the district level. Satisfaction with democracy slightly increases for all categories of voters except those who lost at the second round.

To test our hypotheses, we turn to regression analysis. Our first two models compare the effect of winning at the national and district level. Results are displayed in Table 3. Model 1 compares these effects for the first round of the legislative election, while Model 2 compares them for the second round. Both models reveal that winning at the national level has a greater impact on satisfaction with democracy

**Table 2:** Satisfaction with democracy for winners and losers

	<i>Satisfaction with democracy before election (mean) (0 not satisfied at all; 10 very satisfied)</i>			
	<i>Before the election</i>	<i>After the election</i>	<i>Difference</i>	<i>N</i>
Abstaining (first and second round)	5.48	5.12	-0.36	133
Voting for a national winning party (first round)	6.47	6.99	+0.54	247
Voting for a national losing party (first round)	6.00	5.87	-0.13	462
Voting for a national winning party (second round)	6.42	6.85	+0.43	310
Voting for a national losing party (second round)	5.94	5.80	-0.14	385
Voting for a qualified district party (first round)	6.31	6.34	+0.03	437
Voting for a not-qualified district party (first round)	5.92	6.13	+0.21	272
Voting for the district winning party (second round)	6.09	6.40	+0.31	285
Voting for a district losing party (second round)	6.20	6.18	-0.02	410

than winning at the district level. Voters who opted for PS or EELV, the two parties that formed the government, are more satisfied after than before the election. And this increase in satisfaction occurs even if the party's local candidate lost in the respondent's district. Compared with abstainers, voters who won in the first round at the national level have a greater satisfaction of about 1.1 on the 10-point scale (regardless of the outcome in the district). Similarly, those who won in the second round at the national are more satisfied by about 1 point compared with this reference group. All these effects are significant at a level of 0.01.

In contrast, voting for the district winning candidate has little to no impact on one's satisfaction with democracy. Voters who opted for a national losing party in the first round had a similar level of satisfaction with democracy than abstainers, regardless of whether they won or lost in their district. The coefficient estimates are small and non-significant. Voting for a candidate who won the second round at the district level somewhat counter-balanced the disappointment of having lost at the national level, though.

Models 1 and 2 essentially support our Hypothesis 1 (positive effect of winning at the national level). Winning in the district (Hypothesis 2) does not have a strong effect on satisfaction with democracy. These results for TRS are in line with studies conducted in FPTP and PR systems (Anderson and LoTempio, 2002; Blais and Gélinau, 2007; Henderson, 2008; Singh *et al*, 2011), which show that winning in the district has little or no impact on satisfaction with democracy. The specificities of the French political system might explain the fact that the outcome at the district level has no importance. Since the 2001 reform of the political system, legislative elections take place directly after the presidential ones. With both elections being only 1 month apart from each other, it is clear that the main objective is to decide

**Table 3:** Predicting satisfaction with democracy after election

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	<i>1st round: National versus district</i>	<i>2nd round: National versus district</i>	<i>1st versus 2nd round: National</i>	<i>1st versus 2nd round: National</i>
<i>Winning/losing variables</i>				
Winning national, winning district	1.063** (0.264)	0.972** (0.234)	—	—
Winning national, losing district	1.100** (0.308)	0.996** (0.218)	—	—
Losing national, winning district	0.294 (0.238)	0.635** (0.226)	—	—
Losing national, losing district	0.455 (0.238)	0.205 (0.203)	—	—
Winning 1st round, winning 2nd round	—	—	1.026** (0.218)	(reference)
Losing 1st round, winning 2nd round	—	—	0.755** (0.270)	-0.271 (0.272)
Winning 1st round, losing 2nd round	—	—	2.038** (0.519)	1.012 (0.520)
Losing 1st round, losing 2nd round	—	—	0.205 (0.195)	-0.820** (0.201)
Abstaining	(reference)	(reference)	(reference)	-1.026** (0.218)
<i>Controls</i>				
Satisfaction with democracy before the election	0.556** (0.029)	0.553** (0.029)	0.560** (0.029)	0.560** (0.029)
Sincere voting (1st round)	-0.028 (0.175)	—	0.040 (0.162)	0.040 (0.162)
Left-right distance from government	-0.065 (0.034)	-0.070* (0.034)	-0.055 (0.034)	-0.055 (0.034)
Age (continuous)	-0.065 (0.034)	0.004 (0.005)	0.005 (0.005)	0.005 (0.005)
Gender	-0.131 (0.138)	-0.125 (0.138)	-0.118 (0.138)	-0.118 (0.138)
Education (4 categories)	-0.131 (0.138)	0.042 (0.065)	0.052 (0.064)	0.052 (0.064)
Region	-0.224 (0.143)	-0.200 (0.140)	-0.206 (0.140)	-0.206 (0.140)
Constant	2.306** (0.449)	2.360** (0.446)	2.289** (0.441)	2.289** (0.441)
<i>N</i>	898	898	898	898
<i>R</i> ² (adjusted)	0.342	0.345	0.351	0.351

Notes: Entries are unstandardized coefficient estimates from fixed-effect OLS models; standard errors in parentheses; ** $P < 0.01$; * $P < 0.05$ (two-tailed); the dependent variable is satisfaction with democracy after the election.



whether the newly elected president will have a majority to govern with. In that context, voting for the candidate who won the district does not have the same impact that voting for the party that secured a majority in the National Assembly. In the specific context of the 2012 legislative elections, it is very likely that voters who voted for one of the two winning parties (PS and EELV) already voted for the PS candidate, François Hollande, in the presidential election.⁵ In that case, winning at the district level logically appears less important than for Hollande's party to win a majority of seats in the National Assembly.

To test Hypothesis 3, we specify a model that includes all the variables concerning losing and winning at the national level in both rounds. The idea is to test whether winning in the first round has a stronger effect on satisfaction with democracy than winning in the second round. From Model 3, we see that it is not the case: Voters who won at one round, regardless of whether it was the first or the second round, have a similar satisfaction boost compared with abstainers (significant at a level of 0.01). This boost is of 0.8 for voters who only won at the second round and of 2.0 for those who only won at the first round. This last coefficient estimate has to be interpreted with caution as only 17 respondents fall into the category of winning at the first and losing at the second round. The standard error is thus logically larger. Winning at the first and at the second round has a similar impact on voter's satisfaction with democracy.

Model 3 also reveals that satisfaction with democracy increases within the same range for voters who won at both rounds and for those who won at only one of them. Compared with abstainers, they score on average 1.0 higher on the 10-point scale (significant at 0.01). At the same time, it appears that voters who lost both rounds have levels of satisfaction similar to abstainers. These results suggest that there are two groups: those who won at least one round, and all others, that is, those who abstained and those who lost in both rounds. Model 4 confirms these findings. When voters who won at both rounds are taken as reference category, only abstainers and those who lost at both rounds disclose significantly lower levels of satisfaction. Winning at the national level definitely has a positive effect on satisfaction with democracy, but it would seem that winning once suffices: those who rally to the winning parties in the second round feel as good as those who support them at both elections. What matters is choosing the party that won the elections, regardless of the moment of the choice, whether this was done in both rounds or in the second only.⁶

Conclusion

The literature has shown that having voted for a winning party increases one's satisfaction with democracy under both FPTP and PR systems. In this study, we tested whether these results hold under TRS. Relying on a pre- and post-election

panel survey conducted during the 2012 legislative election in France, we showed that, as under other settings, voters who opted for one of the two parties that ultimately formed the government, that is, the Socialist party and the Greens, saw their satisfaction with democracy increase. However, there is no support for the hypothesis according to which satisfaction increases among the supporters of the winning party in the district. The absence of effect at the district level is likely to be due to the combination of presidential institutions and the particular electoral cycle, where the legislative elections are held a couple of months after the presidential election, which reinforces the cabinet-centered character of the system.

The existence of two rounds, and thus of two possibilities of winning and losing, offers an interesting opportunity to understand the mechanism at stake in the relationship between the electoral outcome and satisfaction with democracy. According to conventional wisdom, the two rounds have different meanings for voters. While the first vote is from the heart, as voters express their true preference for one party, the second vote is made with the brain. However, our analyses revealed that the effect of having voted for a party that is part of the government in the first round or in the second round is no different. The satisfaction boosts are similar in both cases. Furthermore, winning in both rounds does not produce greater happiness than winning in one round only. Voters who rally the winning parties in the second round are as satisfied with the democratic process as early supporters.

TRS allows voters to express their genuine preferences in the first round, while knowing that for the partisans of minor parties, the odds of seeing their first round choice win the elections are very low.⁷ One might think that this structural bias in the electoral system would produce voters that are dissatisfied with democracy, frustrated that their preferred option is not even present in the second, decisive round. Our results do not support this view. On the contrary, winning one election increases satisfaction with democracy regardless of the round. What matters is whether the voter voted at one point for a party that is part of the government.

Notes

- 1 To be fair, this is nothing surprising as the TRS is used to elect both the President and the lower house of Duverger's native France.
- 2 The other parties accounted for in the analysis are: UMP, *Front National* (FN), *Front de Gauche* (FdG), *MoDem*, *Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste* (NPA), *Lutte Ouvrière* (LO) and *Nouveau Centre* (NC). The few respondents who voted for other parties ($N=48$ in the first round and $N=52$ in the second round) are excluded as we cannot tell whether their vote was sincere or not. Note that among these other parties there was the *Parti radical de gauche* (PRG), which obtained 2 per cent of the votes and had two ministers in the cabinet. Unfortunately, we are unable to distinguish those who voted for that party.
- 3 The mean was weighted by the proportion of portfolios held by each party at the time of the second wave panel. Seventeen government members were from the PS and one from EELV.
- 4 If one includes abstainers, the official results are the following: 16.5 per cent of voters voted for PS and 3.1 per cent for EELV in the first round; in the second round, 21.8 per cent of voters voted for PS and



- 1.9 per cent for EELV; abstention was of 42.8 per cent at the first round and of 44.6 per cent at the second round.
- 5 EELV had a candidate in the presidential elections, Eva Joly, but she gathered only 2.3 per cent of the vote share and did not qualify for the second round.
 - 6 It is important to note that this result is not an artifact of the ideological bloc identification. Among respondents who voted for a non-winning left-wing parties at the first round (that is, FdG or NPA, $N=70$), those who rallied a winning party at the second round are more satisfied than those who did not. The average change in satisfaction with democracy after the election (compared with before) among those who voted for a winning party ($N=47$) is +0.5, while it is 0.0 among those who abstained or voted for a losing party ($N=23$). The sample is, however, too small for this difference to be statistically significant.
 - 7 One exception to this situation is when a minor party concludes an electoral alliance with a major party, as it was the case for EELV (and PRG) and PS in the 2012 legislative elections. In these elections, EELV obtained 66 districts (out of 577) without a PS candidate. In this case, the odds for an EELV candidate to get qualified for the second round were much higher.

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Appendix

Description of sample representativity

Source for overall population figures:

France's National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE).

IDF: www.insee.fr/fr/themes/tableau.asp?reg_id=20&ref_id=poptc02104.

PACA: www.insee.fr/fr/themes/tableau.asp?reg_id=5&ref_id=poptc02104.

Table A1: Age and gender

		<i>Gender</i>					
		<i>Total</i> <i>(population)</i> <i>(in percentage)</i>	<i>Total</i> <i>(sample)</i>	<i>Male</i> <i>(population)</i> <i>(in percentage)</i>	<i>Male</i> <i>(sample)</i>	<i>Female</i> <i>(population)</i> <i>(in percentage)</i>	<i>Female</i> <i>(sample)</i>
IDF	Total	100	1000	48	475	52	525
	<i>Age</i>						
	18–34 years	32	321	16	157	16	164
	35–54 years	37	368	18	180	19	188
	55–99 years	31	311	14	138	17	173
PACA	Total	100	1000	48	480	52	520
	<i>Age</i>						
	18–34 years	25	250	12	122	13	128
	35–54 years	35	349	17	165	18	184
	55–99 years	40	401	19	193	21	208

Table A2: Education

	<i>IDF</i>		<i>PACA</i>	
	<i>Population</i> <i>(in percentage)</i>	<i>Sample</i>	<i>Population</i> <i>(in percentage)</i>	<i>Sample</i>
No degree	18	179	20	197
Primary education degree	7	73	10	101
Junior school certificate (BEPC)	6	61	8	75
Professional junior school certificate (CAP or BEP)	17	172	22	219
Baccalaureate or professional certificate	16	164	17	168
2-year university degree	13	127	11	114
More than 2 year university degree	22	224	13	126